Abstract. Content-based Anomaly Detection (AD) techniques are regarded as a promising mechanism to detect 'zero-day' attacks. AD sensors have also been shown to perform better than signature-based systems in detecting polymorphic attacks. However, the False Positive Rates (FPRs) produced by current AD sensors have been a cause of concern. In this paper, we introduce and evaluate transAD, a system of network traffic inspection AD sensors that are based on Transductive Confidence Machines (TCM). Existing TCM-based implementations have very high FPRs when used as NIDS.
Introduction
Web applications have become an integral part of our lives providing us a platform to accomplish various essential tasks. For example Internet banking, e-commerce, and e-prescription services exchange personally identifiable information that need to be safeguarded. Many widely deployed out-of-the box web product solutions have become easy and profitable targets for attackers. Attacks on these web based applications have been on the rise [12, 19] . Although existing Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) play an important role in preventing attacks on web services, the rising number and new types of attacks highlight the need for improved web defenses.
Industry relies primarily on signature based NIDS [4, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18 ] to secure their networks. These systems rely on previously known signatures to identify attacks. Without prior known signatures, signature based NIDS are unable to detect new attacks, i.e., "zero-day" attacks. TransAD is one of a class of NIDS that use algorithms based on Anomaly Detection (AD) to combat zero-day attacks. AD sensors analyze traffic and identify deviations from "normal" patterns as potential attacks. However, designing these promising systems presents several challenges. First, implementations generally rely on highly labor intensive labeled training data as a basis for establishing the normal traffic pattern [16] . Second, high False Positive Rates (FPRs) are seen as a major drawback due to the amount of effort required to analyze false positives [14] . Third, AD sensors can potentially be subject to poisoning attacks that intentionally modify the learned normal model to allow various types of attacks [23] . Current AD sensors have failed to completely address all of these issues, and therefore, have not been widely deployed in industry [14, 16] .
In this paper, we present transAD -a new self-learning, ensemble based AD system for the web that solves all three problems. Unlike many other AD systems, our system features a completely unsupervised learning algorithm that does not require any labeled training data. Given the volume of data processed by a NIDS, labeling training data for NIDS requires a prohibitive amount of manual effort and is a time consuming process. Additionally, most of the supervised learning algorithms learn a static model of traffic and are unable to adapt over time to changes in the system. Adapting to changing traffic patterns requires additional sets of manually labeled training data at regular intervals for re-training the supervised AD sensor. This additional time and effort required to keep supervised AD sensors updated makes their use impractical in the real world. Consequently, these methods have been heavily criticized [16] . Our method does not use labeled training data and works with network traffic collected without any manual intervention. Therefore, our method does not require any manual effort to label a training data set; and transAD is capable of continuously self-adapting to the changes in the system without additional manual intervention or effort.
In addition to obviating the manual effort and time required for labeling training data sets, our system is designed to generate low FPRs. TransAD does this by using a combination of ensemble of sensors called micro-models, an unsupervised AD algorithm, and our hash based distance metric. Each micro-model uses the unsupervised AD algorithm to identify potential attacks. To identify potential attacks, each packet is evaluated by all of the micro-models independently. Decisions made by individual micro-models in the ensemble are combined using a voting mechanism. The use of an ensemble gives robustness to the determination of attacks (those that are considered anomalous by a majority of micro-models), and serves to reduce the errors, FPR in particular.
It is important to note that the direct application of the comparable AD algorithm for NIDS produces unacceptably high FPRs of approximately 3% [10] . Our AD sensor, on the other hand, yields an average FPR of 0.28% when evaluated using two real world data sets. It is the judicious combination of the AD technique, with ensemble methods, and a proper distance metric that allows us to obtain demonstratively outstanding low FPRs and high detection rates in the evaluation section of this paper. The novelty of our approach comes from the successful combination of the above techniques.
In order to evaluate our system, we conducted experiments using two large data sets collected from a public university's web servers. These data sets contain 1.1 million packets of which thousands were attack packets. To statistically analyze the data from our experimental results, we manually labeled over 18,500 alert packets. Our results demonstrate that we are able to achieve high detection rates, while keeping the FPR very low. More importantly, the reduction in the average number of false alarms, reduces the amount of effort wasted by operators.
The following is a summary of the primary contributions of this work:
-Developed a novel Anomaly Detection based Network Intrusion Detection system for the Web that is based on unsupervised learning and does not require labeled training data. -Applied a novel combination of our hash based distance metric, unsupervised AD system, and ensemble based techniques to produce outstandingly low false positive rates.
Related Work
There are many approaches used for network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). In general, systems are categorized into signature-based and anomaly-based systems. Signature-based systems rely on a database of attack signatures and compare new data against these existing signatures. Many signature-based detectors are available commercially (e.g. CISCO [4] , Juniper [9] , McAfee [13], Snort [17] , Suricata [18], Bro [15] ). These approaches are widely used, provide high detection rates, and low FPRs for previously known attacks. Signature-based systems contrast with anomaly-based sensors which typically approach the problem by creating a normal model of the system, and then detect variations from normal [6] . The advantage of anomaly based systems is the ability to detect previously unseen (i.e. "zero-day") attacks. However, the resulting algorithms frequently suffer from high FPRs making them burdensome for human operators [14, 16] .
Anomaly detectors designed as NIDS include the Anagram [23] and PAYL [22, 24] anomaly detection systems. Anagram stores the n-grams, a contiguous sequence of n characters of a given string, in a Bloom filter [2] . Anagram scores new packets by the percentage of the n-grams not seen in the training data. PAYL models the frequency of 1-grams in the "normal" model and compares the frequency distribution of an incoming packet to the training data. Both these algorithms requires clean training data which places a large burden on the operator forcing them to label a large number of packets.
The AD sensor we introduce has its roots in existing machine learning principles for transduction [1] . In transduction, potential attacks are determined by comparing the strangeness of incoming packets to the baseline model. The strangeness represents how different an incoming packet is from the normal baseline model. This process is further described in Section 3.3. The authors in [10] present DNIDS a TCM based IDS that uses a strangeness definition taken from the work of TCM classifiers [21] . In [1] an improved strangeness function is introduced which results in performance improvements of the AD sensor. The KDD 1999 benchmark data set used to evaluate DNIDS is outdated and known to contain attacks that are easily separable [20] . Therefore the evaluation presented in [21] is unreliable. Additionally, DNIDS yields a 3% FPR which is an unacceptably high value for a NIDS.
System Architecture
Our AD sensor consists of the following main components: A filtering and a preprocessing stage, an ensemble of micro-models, a voting mechanism, and a drift scheme. The system architecture is shown in Figure 1 . At the filtering stage, only packets of interest are allowed to pass through the filter and the rest of the packets are discarded. The pre-processing stage extracts the content of the packet and prepares it for use by the AD algorithm. The pre-processed packets are now used to build the ensemble of micro-models. Each micro-model consists of packets collected for a fixed period of time (epoch) called the micro-model duration. Multiple micro-models are created from sequential epochs to form an ensemble. Each micro-model in the ensemble evaluates each test packet, and their decisions are combined using a voting mechanism.
Initially, our AD sensor starts by collecting a baseline of packets that represents the normal incoming pattern of traffic. TransAD builds ensembles in real time by breaking the baseline data into timed "epochs" called a micro-model. Many micro-models are built by collecting packets for multiple epochs to form an ensemble. Once the initial ensemble is ready, new packets are evaluated by the ensemble of micro-models. Every micro-model individually acts as an AD sensor that uses packets contained in the respective micro-model as the normal sample. In order to evaluate if a packet is a potential attack, it is individually evaluated by each micro-model in the ensemble using the transduction technique. Individual decisions of each micro-model in the ensemble are combined by a weighted voting scheme to arrive at a final decision. If a packet is voted as an attack, an alert is generated by our sensor.
The final component of our sensor helps keeps our sensor up-to-date with respect to the changes in the monitored environment over time. The normal traffic patterns may change due to changes in the types of services offered and/or changes in the behavior of users. If the system does not adapt to these changes, the detection rate and FPR of the system may be adversely affected. Our sensor adapts to these changes by building new micro-models using tested packets. 
Bootstrapping transAD
Bootstrapping is the process of building the initial ensemble of micro-models of our AD sensor. Our sensor targets web traffic containing GET requests because they are a common attack vector used by perpetrators. All the GET request packets received by transAD are pre-processed using a filtering and normalization process to enable the AD algorithm to easily identify potential attack packets. Next, these packets are used to build the initial ensemble of micromodels. This is followed by a sanitization process where the micro-model ensemble self-cleanses and removes potential attacks. This sub-section describes the bootstrapping process in greater detail. Although, our system uses GET requests for evaluation, it can be extended to work with other protocols. POST requests, another popular HTTP method, consist of approximately 0.025% of the total requests received by our web server. Since this makes up a very small portion of the requests seen by our AD sensor, we leave consideration of POST requests for the future.
Filtering and Normalization of GET Requests: As the packets arrive, the filter removes packets other than those containing GET requests with user supplied arguments. Only GET requests with user supplied arguments are allowed through the filter because user arguments is the only part of the request that contains attacks.
Once the packets have been filtered they are normalized. The normalization process involves the following steps: replacing escaped hex characters in GET requests with their respective ASCII characters; discarding numbers in the GET request parameters because strings form the core of a potential attack; and converting the characters into lower case characters to simplify comparison. Normalizing the GET request parameters helps our AD sensor to better discriminate between normal and abnormal packets [3] . Therefore, the filtering and normalization processes are applied to all the packets in the bootstrap phase and also to the packets that are tested during normal operation.
Building Micro-models: Once the packets are normalized, they are ready to be included in a micro-model. Each micro-model is built using the packets collected for a fixed time duration (epoch) called the micro-model duration. Several micro-models are built using packets collected from consecutive, but disjoint, epochs to form an ensemble of micro-models. Since real network traffic is used to build micro-models, they may potentially contain attack packets. In order to ensure we have clean data in our micro-models, we use a sanitization process.
Sanitizing the Micro-models: The sanitization process self-cleanses the initial micro-models without any manual intervention. In the sanitization process, each packet in a micro-model is evaluated by all the other micro-models in the ensemble by using the transduction method. The individual decision of the other micro-models in the ensemble are combined using a weighted voting scheme. The weights for each micro-model are in proportion to the number of packets used to build the micro-model. The packets that are voted as potential attacks by the rest of the ensemble are discarded from the micro-model. Only those packets voted as normal are retained in the respective micro-models. This process is repeated for every packet in every micro-model in the initial ensemble.
The sanitization process results in relatively clean data because the majority of the attacks are short-lived, and a given attack is usually limited to a small subset of micro-models. Thus, the sanitization process self-cleans the micromodel by removing packets that are considered anomalous by a majority of the ensemble. Sanitization has also shown to improve the performance in comparable systems [5] .
At the end of this bootstrap process, we have an ensemble of filtered, preprocessed packets that are included in sanitized micro-models that is ready to diagnose future packets.
Model Drift
Once the bootstrapping process is complete, we have a sanitized micro-model ensemble. However, the initial ensemble of micro-models may become stale over time and may no longer represent the normal traffic pattern. Micro-models become stale for two reasons: first, changes are made to the services offered within a network; second, the behavior of users interacting with the network changes. As a result, if the ensemble is not updated, it may not conform to the normal traffic pattern and AD sensors could produce more FPs. To adapt to this model drift, we used a scheme where older micro-models are discarded as new micro-models become available.
Distance Metric and Strangeness
To decide if a packet is a potential attack, our sensor utilizes a technique called transduction [8] . The transduction method computes the fitness of a test packet with respect to a micro-model. The fitness is computed utilizing a function called strangeness that measures the uniqueness (or isolation) of the packet. With respect to the normal packets in each micro-model, the fitness test takes the form of a hypothesis test [25] , in which the null hypothesis is that 'the test packet fits the sample distribution.' When the result of the test is statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis and therefore consider the test packet a potential attack.
The strangeness function can take many forms. In the experiments documented in this paper we use the sum of the distances to a packet's k-nearest neighbors (k-NN). This strangeness function has been shown to work efficiently in [1] . Our sensor uses an improved hash-based distance to measure the distance between two packets. Greater the distance between two packets, the less similar they are. This hash-distance is used to identify a test packet's k-NNs in each micro-model; the strangeness of a test packet is the sum of the hash-distance to the k-nearest neighbors.
In order to compute the nearest neighbors to test packets, we need a suitable distance measure. Since the objective of our implementation is to find abnormal GET request parameter strings, we must use a suitable distance measure that is designed to works with strings. Initially, we tried using Levenshtein string edit distance [11] . However, our experiments using the Levenshtein distance resulted in unacceptably high FPRs. We solved this problem by introducing a hash-based distance that produced a 43% reduction in FPRs when compared to Levenshtein distance.
The hash-based distance works on n-grams, sub-sequences of 'n' characters, of the normalized GET request parameters. A sliding window is used to extract all the n-grams from a GET request. A hash table is created with n-grams of the GET request parameters as the key and packet identifier as the value. FNV1a 32-bit [7] hashing algorithm is used to generate the hash table. We chose FNV1a 32-bit hashing algorithm for its efficiency and low collision rate.
To compute the distance between two normalized GET requests, each of the n-grams of the test request is looked up in the hash table. If the hash bucket that contains that n-gram has the identifier of a micro-model request, then an n-gram match is recorded. The distance is computed by subtracting the total number of n-gram matches normalized by the number of n-grams in the larger GET request from 1 as shown in Equation 1. For example, in Figure 2 , the two strings "abcdefg" and "ahbcdz" have one common 3-gram "bcd" that is hashed to the same bucket and is recorded as a match. The number of 3-grams in the larger string is 5. Therefore, the distance between the two strings is 0.8 (1− 1/5). Distance = 1 − total number n-gram matches number of n-grams in the larger string (1) In the example shown in Figure 2 , the hash distance performs a simple n-gram match without considering the position of the n-grams in both the requests. Simple n-gram matching is a very relaxed measure of similarity and does not take into account the context of the n-grams present in the two requests; and it does not produce a very accurate representation of distance between the two strings. In order to address this issue, we considered the positions of the n-grams in the request while counting the number of matches. To improve on simple n-gram matching, a relative-distance delta (rΔ) parameter is introduced to consider a range of possible n-gram positions that should be counted as a match. The simple n-gram matching (rΔ = ∞) does not consider the n-gram positions. The most restrictive version would require the position of n-grams in the two requests to be the same (rΔ = 0). If n-gram at position x in the test request has at least one occurrence of the same n-gram in the range of positions [x − rΔ, x + rΔ] in the micro-model request, the match count is incremented by one. Matches are considered for all the occurrences of the each n-gram in the test request. In order to eliminate the duplicate n-gram matches, the number of matches cannot exceed the occurrence count of the same n-gram in either of the two requests. Therefore, the number of n-gram matches is defined as the minimum of the following values for the n-gram in question:
-the number of matches counted for each occurrence -the occurrence count in the test request -the occurrence count in the micro-model request The hash distance using the relative position parameter is computed as shown in Equation 1. The sum of the hash distances of the k-nearest neighbors is used to compute the strangeness of the test packet, and the fitness test uses of the strangeness of the test packet to determine if the packet is a potential attack using a hypothesis test.
Evaluation
In this section we evaluated the performance of our AD sensor using two real world data sets. Our results show that using transAD yields high detection rates and low FPRs. Additionally, we compared the performance of the transAD sensor with another AD sensor, Sanitization Tool for ANomaly Detection (STAND) [5] .
Data Sets
We used two data sets 1 consisting of 461 million packets to calibrate and evaluate our AD sensor. The details of the two data sets containing network traffic arriving at George Mason University's main web server are shown in Tab. 1. In order to evaluate our AD sensor, unique alerts generated by transAD and STAND for the both data sets were manually labeled as attacks or benign packets. To assist in the expert manual inspection of the alert packets, each alert packet's content was compared to attacks seen at honey pot sites and it's source IP was checked against black lists and Offensive IP databases. Manually inspecting the contents of all these alert packets was a time consuming process.
Of the 18,500+ unique alerts generated by both transAD and STAND, 13,443 were unique True Positive (TP) alerts. It was relatively easy to identify TPs, but identifying all of the False Negatives (FNs) was prohibitive as it required analyzing every packet in each data set. In order to estimate the FNs, we identified transAD's FNs as the TPs identified by STAND but missed by transAD. Similarly, STAND's FNs were identified as the TPs identified by transAD but missed by STAND. While this method does not give us a perfect count, it was feasible and represents a lower bound on FNs.
Parameter Evaluation
In order to study the performance of our AD sensor with respect to the parameters described in Table 2 , we conducted experiments to explore the parameter space. The first data set with labeled alerts was used to explore the parameter space. Initially, the parameter values were set to the initial values based on existing literature for comparable AD sensors as shown in the Table 2 . Experiments were conducted by varying one parameter at a time while rest of the parameters were set to initial values. When a better parameter was observed, it was noted as the default value (see Table 2 ). After the default values for all parameters were defined, the experiments were re-run using the default parameters and varying the parameter of interest. The results form these experiments were used to plot Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves. Each point in a curve is plotted by computing the True Positive Rate (TPR) and FPR at the following confidence levels used for the hypothesis test: 100%, 98%, 95%, 90%, 85%, 80%, 75%, 70%, and 65%. We analyze the ROC curve and the Area Under the Curve (AUC) values to select the default parameters for our experiments. As an example we show how the micro-model duration parameter was selected. 
Micro-Model
Micro-models used in our sensor are built using packets received 3 h 4 h Duration (Δ) in a fixed epoch. The length of this epoch is the duration of each micro-model.
n-gram Size (g)
The hash based distance scheme presented earlier uses n-grams to 6 6 compute the distance between two GET request parameters. This specifies the number of characters in the n-gram.
Relative n-Gram
For n-grams with matching content, rΔ specifies the range of ∞ 10 Position Matching (rΔ) positions between the n-grams in the request for them to be considered a match.
Confidence Level (c)
Confidence level is used by the hypothesis to evaluate if -80% a given packet is normal. Confidence level estimates the reliability of the decisions made by the hypothesis test.
Voting Threshold (T)
The voting threshold is the percentage of micro-models in the 0.66 0.66 ensemble that must agree for a packet to be labeled abnormal.
Ensemble Size (e)
The number of micro-models used in the ensemble. 25 25
Drift Parameter (r)
The drift parameter denotes the number of old micro-models in 1 1 the ensemble discarded and the number of staged micro-models inducted into the ensemble at a time.
Micro-Model duration(Δ):
A good micro-model duration needs to be chosen to accurately and fully characterize the normal traffic pattern. Figure 3 shows a magnification of the left hand portion of the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve for Δ's between 1 and 5 hours. The FPR considerably improves as micro-model duration is increased and reaches a minimum at 4 and 5 hours, and the AUC reaches a maximum for 4 and 5 hours with the value 0.9989. Further analysis of the graph indicates that our AD sensor has similar performance for Δs of 4 and 5 hours. Since there is no additional improvement in the FPR with a 5 hour micromodel duration, we set the default value of Δ to 4 hours. 
N-gram Size:
We tested the performance of our system with n-gram sizes of 5 through 9. The maximum AUC value of 0.9989 is observed for n-gram size 6. After analyzing the ROC curve, n-gram size 6 is set as the default value.
Relative Position Matching (rΔ): Three relative position matching values were used in the Hash Distance metric: exact position matching (rΔ = 0); rΔ = 10; and simple n-gram matching (rΔ = ∞). Simple n-gram matching has the maximum AUC value of 0.999 and rΔ = 10 has the next best AUC of 0.9989. Although, rΔ = 10 has a slightly lower AUC compared to simple n-gram matching, it improves our system's defense against poisoning attacks. Therefore, we set rΔ to 10 as the default value.
Voting Threshold:
The performance of transAD was tested with the following voting thresholds: 0.66 (absolute majority), 0.5 (simple majority), 0.4, and 0.3. The AUC is maximum for the absolute majority voting threshold at 0.9989. After analyzing the ROC curves, we use 0.66 as the default voting threshold.
Ensemble Size: We tested our sensor using ensemble sizes 15, 25, and 35. Ensemble size 25 has the maximum AUC value 0.9989. After analyzing the ROC curve, we chose ensemble size 25 as the default parameter.
Model Drift: We examined two different drift settings of 1 and 5. For drift setting 'x', as soon as the 'x' new micro-model(s) are ready, they are included in the ensemble and the 'x' oldest micro-models are discarded. The AUC for both the drift polices have the same value of 0.9989. After analyzing the ROC curve, 1 is selected as the default drift parameter value.
While it is possible to tune the parameters for an individual network as we did, in the future we plan to evaluate our sensor across different networks with the goal of automatically tuning parameters to observed traffic.
Comparison to Sanitization Tool for ANomaly Detection (STAND)
In this subsection, we compare the detection and false positive rates of transAD with STAND. The TP, FP, TN, and FN counts and rates generated by transAD and STAND for the two data sets are computed. This data is shown For the first data set the TPR (detection rate) and False Positive Rate (FPR) for transAD are 92.78% and 0.40% respectively. As presented in the above tables, the TPR and FPR for STAND are 92.52% and 0.57% respectively. Using transAD reduces the FPR by 29.82%; the TPR for transAD and STAND were similar.
The TPR and FPR for the second data set for transAD are 94.77% and 0.15% respectively; for STAND they are 77.97% and 0.13% respectively. Using transAD increases the detection rate by 18% when compared to STAND. The FPR for transAD and STAND were similar. It is interesting to note that for this data set, STAND has a 14.5% lower detection rate when compared to the first data set results. However, transAD performs consistently with over 90% detection rate for both the data sets. From these two data sets, transAD performed better than STAND. In the first data set where transAD and STAND had comparable detection rates, transAD had a lower FPR. For the second data set where transAD and STAND had comparable FPRs, transAD performed better with a much higher detection rate.
Conclusions
We introduced a new AD sensor, transAD, that combines proven technology with new methods to achieve high detection rates and low FPRs. Our sensor consistently yielded good results for two real world data sets. For the two data sets, our AD sensor detected actual attacks; none of which have were previously known to transAD and therefore demonstrated that transAD is able to detect zero-day attacks. Additionally, transAD was shown to be more effective than STAND a leading AD sensor.
TransAD is a new content-based Anomaly Detection sensor for network intrusion detection based on transduction. Our AD sensor uses an unsupervised learning algorithm which obviates the need for labeled training data. Therefore, our sensor does not require manual labeling of training data and adapts to changes in the system without additional manual effort.
We conducted a thorough evaluation of our sensor using two real-world data sets. To validate it's performance we manually label over 18,500 alerts. After tuning the parameters used by transAD, we found our sensor achieves consistently high detection rates for both the data sets while having generally lower FPRs than STAND. This unequivocally shows that our AD sensor which is a novel combination of transduction, hash based distance, and ensemble based techniques, produces very low FPRs while achieving high detection rates is suitable for deployment.
